Prime Minister (Ireland/UK), thus overruling opponents. The focus here is on the arguments used to justify that decision. This article thus relies on sources such as parliamentary or Congressional debates, speeches, and the relevant papers in the British and Irish national archives.
Firstly, however, the notion that the Genocide Convention is a human rights treaty needs to be nuanced. Although it clearly aims to prevent massive human rights abuses, it differs from human rights treaties because the latter do not usually define crimes, and a 'typical human rights treaty prohibits certain conduct by states but does not provide for the punishment of individuals' (Quigley, 2006: 79; see also Schabas, 2009: 2-3) . The Genocide Convention does both and thus contributes to international human rights law and international criminal law. It defines genocide as an international crime which the parties to the Convention 'undertake to prevent and punish'. Persons committing genocide or other acts, including conspiracy to commit genocide or complicity in genocide, are to be punished, regardless of whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, officials or private individuals. Persons charged with genocide are to be tried by a tribunal of the state in whose territory the act was committed, or by an 'international penal tribunal' (yet to be established). The fact that the Genocide Convention sets out an obligation not only to prevent genocide but also to punish the crime, means that domestic criminal law almost always has to be altered to comply with the Convention. While some democracies, such as Sweden or Denmark, have had few problems with this (see Smith 2010: 42-3) , other countries, including all three considered here, have.
Why ratify an international human rights treaty? Why refuse to do so?
The reticence to ratify or accede to the Genocide Convention has attracted little interest from International Relations scholars, though a few studies cover the acceptance process in some western countries (Kaufman 1990; LeBlanc 1991; Power 2002; Simpson 2002; Smith 2010 ). Yet several interesting questions for IR are raised by these cases.
Why do some democracies refuse to commit to international human rights treaties? What factors then lead them to drop their reticence? Analysis of the initial reticence of some western democracies to adopt the Genocide Convention, and their eventual acceptance of it, could provide us with more answers to the broad questions of why and how 'state socialisation' happens, and what may impede that process.
Why states commit to human rights conventions is a question inherently linked to the questions of why and how international norms in general are diffused and accepted by states -the process of state socialisation (see Johnston, 2001: 494-6) . Norms are defined here as 'collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity' (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54) , and acceptance of a human rights treaty signals acceptance of certain standards of state behaviour. The literature abounds in possible explanations for why states ratify human rights treaties (see Avdeyeva, 2007; Cole, 2005; Hathaway, 2007; Moravcsik, 2000; Oberdörster 2008; Simmons, 2009; Struett and Weldon, 2006; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008) , and how and why human rights norms spread, especially to non-democracies or recently-established democracies (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Flockhart, 2006; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2006) .
The first assumption is that there have to be reasons why states ratify or accede to international human rights treaties in the face of what would otherwise be a reluctance to do so. 4 In other words, the default position for states is not to take on international commitments in the field of human rights, particularly commitments that would expose the state to international scrutiny or require domestic action to ensure conformity to the international treaty (and the more the state might have to fear scrutiny or undertake reforms, the less likely it is to accede to an international treaty). However, Beth Simmons points out that democracies are expected to ratify human rights treaties early, because 'these treaties to a great extent reflect the values of civil and political liberties, equality of opportunity, and individual rights upon which these systems are largely based' (Simmons, 2009: 65) . In such cases, the 'domestic salience' of the particular international human rights norm is high (Cortell and Davis, 1996: 456) . If a norm has domestic legitimacy, then the state will conform to it much more easily.
Yet there are also cases of what Simmons (2009: 58) calls 'false negatives', states that may value the content of the treaty but nonetheless fail to ratify or delay doing so.
She argues that 'common law systems provide incentives for governments to go slow when it comes to treaty ratification ' (2009: 71) . There are greater adjustment costs in common law systems than civil law systems, and a risk that judges (more independent in common law systems) will interpret the treaty more widely than desired (2009: 72-3). All three countries considered here have common law systems. However, other common law countries -Australia and Canada -ratified the Genocide Convention quickly. Simmons also posits that the multiplicity of veto players in the ratification process could delay or impede ratification (2009: 68-9) , but the ratification hurdles in each country considered here are different: she gives the UK a score of 1.5, Ireland a score of 2, and the US a score of 3 (out of 4) -the higher the score, the higher the hurdle. 5 Although neither of these two explanations -common law, the number of veto players -fully explains why Ireland, the UK and the US did not accept the Genocide Convention for so long, they could illuminate why it was difficult for proponents of the Convention to prevail.
Delays or refusals to ratify international human rights treaties could be caused by a domestic clash of norms. If ratifying the international treaty means incorporating norms that compete with other domestic norms, then the likelihood of ratifying the treaty will depend on the relative strength of that particular norm. Lower domestic salience of the new norm leads to preference for the pre-existing norm (see Cortell and Davis, 1996: 456) . The clash of norms raises the costs of accepting the treaty, because to do so, the competing norm(s) must be put aside or adjusted. As discussed below, in the US, accepting the Genocide Convention entailed a clash with the norm of 'national sovereignty'; in Ireland and the UK, acceptance clashed with a norm on granting asylum.
What, then, sways the balance in favour of ratification or accession in reticent countries? The literature in general often focuses on two factors: material incentives or disincentives used by more powerful actors (other states or international organisations), or the use of persuasive arguments by other actors (other states, international organisations, or transnational advocacy groups). As Hiro Katsumata pointed out, 'the existing literature suggest that norms without compatibility can be promoted in a local society, when they are backed by great powers or transnational struggles' (Katsumata, 2011: 561) .
Much of the literature, however, focuses on the spread of norms to non-western democracies. Some studies highlight the effectiveness of a combination of both strategies, persuasion and the use of incentives or disincentives. Thomas Risse and
Kathryn Sikkink argue that 'the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western governments' (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 5; see also Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902) . Western governments then put pressure on norm-violating governments to conform to human rights norms, including by setting conditions for aid or other benefits. Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel find that transnational advocacy networks are less crucial than 'socialising agencies', namely regional organisations, and persuasion is less effective than material incentives: 'successful international socialization…depends on the size and credibility of tangible political incentives manipulated by the community organizations and the size of political costs incurred by the target states in adopting fundamental community rules' (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, 2006: 255) .
In the case of our three countries and the Genocide Convention, there were no international or regional organisations pressing or persuading them to ratify or accede to Constructivists often focus on the process of persuasion as leading to socialisation, and hence compliance with a norm (Johnston, 2001: 493 (Johnston, 2001: 499) . Politicians and policy-makers (among others) are convinced -or learn -that accepting the norm is the right thing to do, in accordance with a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2011) .
Besides the logic of appropriateness and consideration of reputational costs, 'acculturation' may prompt a state to ratify a treaty. (Johnston refers to this as 'social influence' ; Johnston 2001: 499) . This is 'the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture' (Goodman and Jinks, 2004: 638) . States wish to belong to certain 'social groups', and so will conform to the norms of that group (see Flockhart, 2006) . 'Identification with a group can generate a range of cognitive and social pressures to conform' (Johnston, 2001: 499) . Thus the extent to which actors compared their country with others in a desired social group that had ratified the Genocide Convention is a sign of acculturation. Furthermore, acculturation is associated . The importance of reference groups is acknowledged elsewhere in the literature.
Finnemore and Sikkink's work on the norm life cycle includes a 'tipping point', where a critical mass of relevant actors adopt a norm and then prompt a 'norm cascade'. This critical mass, they surmise, may consist of one-third of the states in the system, but 'it also matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are critical to a norm's adoption; others are less so' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901) . Beth Simmons argues that 'the region in which a country is situated is theoretically most relevant to the decision to make a treaty commitment' (Simmons, 2009: 90 ; see also Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008: 748) . As will be seen below, the reference group cited by Irish politicians is the European Community. However, in the case of the UK and the US, the reference group cited by politicians is usually other democracies -the countries listed in Appendix 1.
The international context -the 'surrounding culture' in Goodman and Jinks'
terms -is also important in acculturation processes. During the 1960s, the international human rights regime was strengthened: negotiations on the two international covenants (on economic, social and cultural rights, and on civil and political rights) were concluded in 1966; in 1963, the UN General Assembly declared 1968 to be 'International Human Rights Year' during which an international conference on human rights was held in
Tehran; and Amnesty International was founded in 1961 (though Moyn points out that only in the 1970s did human rights 'explode'; Moyn, 2010: 129) . Perhaps more importantly, from the early 1960s there was increasing awareness of the Holocaust (Power, 2002: 73) , and in the US and Europe, there was considerable mobilisation of civil society in response to purported genocide in Biafra, Nigeria (though other purported genocides in the former East Pakistan or Cambodia received less attention; see Smith, 2010: 67-97) . The surrounding culture was shifting in ways that would make it more uncomfortable for a state to remain outside the Genocide Convention, and could thus increase the social pressure to conform to the Convention.
How useful are these factors for explaining the initial resistance of the three democracies and their eventual acceptance of the Genocide Convention? To answer that question, the arguments put forward by politicians, ministry officials and legislators are analysed in the following sections.
The domestic debates about the Convention
The positions of the three countries during the negotiations on the draft of the Convention cannot be covered in any depth here, but are worth summarising. Ireland was not a member of the UN at the time, so did not participate in the negotiations at all. The US and the UK did participate, the former more actively than the latter. The US voted for the Convention in the General Assembly and signed it on 11 December 1948, just two days after it was adopted by the General Assembly. The UK, in contrast, did not sign the Convention, and very nearly abstained from voting on it in the General Assembly, because of concerns that acceptance of the Convention into British law would entail changes to the laws on granting asylum and the Cabinet had not agreed to this. Though the UK did in the end vote for the Convention, the British delegate told the General
Assembly that the UK's vote was without prejudice to the right to grant asylum (Simpson, 2003: 14-35) .
After the Convention was signed, all three countries had to consider whether they would ratify it (in the case of the US) or accede to it (in the cases of Ireland and the UK).
The domestic debates on the Convention differed quite dramatically. In the US, there was a very public debate on the Convention, centred on the US Senate consideration of the treaty, in which vociferous opposition to the Convention was evident right from the start.
The pros and cons of ratifying the treaty were thus played out in public. In both Ireland and the UK, there was hardly any public debate on the Convention at all; instead, the matter was the subject of disputes behind the scenes between the foreign ministry, keenly aware of issues such as the country's international reputation, and the home affairs ministry, adamant that the incorporation of the Convention into domestic law had negative implications. American citizens to trial abroad, threaten the US form of government, infringe on domestic jurisdiction, increase international entanglements, and violate the rights of the fifty states by leading to federal interference in segregation and race-related crimes in the southern US (Kaufman, 1990: 37-63 ; see also Cooper, 2008: 189-208) . Such arguments were heard again and again (Kaufman, 1990: 196 (LeBlanc, 1991: 6-7, 91) . But although the Committee on Foreign
Relations favourably reported the Convention to the Senate four times (in 1970, 1971, 1973, and 1976) US ratification of the Convention was supported by a large number of civil society groups: religious groups, women's organisations, trade unions, civil liberties 6 The same 'sovereigntist' arguments appeared again in the vociferous opposition to the International Criminal Court (see Casey and Rivkin 1998; Goldsmith 2003 document' which the US should therefore ratify (Proxmire, 1977: 6) . He pointed out that 'all of our major NATO and SEATO allies have acceded to the treaty. We stand alone among free Western nations' (Proxmire, 1977: 4) .
Supporters also, however, noted that failure to ratify the Convention gave 'enemies' of the US a public relations victory. Proxmire argued that it 'has been a constant source of embarrassment to us diplomatically that has puzzled our allied and delighted our enemies…There is no logic in continuing to provide others with a club with which to hit us' (Proxmire, 1977: 4) . This concern about the reputational costs of not ratifying the treaty was repeated frequently. The New York Times noted that if the Senate failed to approve the Convention again, it would merely 'invite propagandists around the world, hostile or just simplistic, to take another shot ' (New York Times, 1984) . Proxmire argued that time and again, Soviet representatives at the United Nations and at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe indicated that a country that had not ratified the Genocide Convention 'had no right to lecture the Soviet Union on human rights' (Power, 2002: 159) . Thus supporters used arguments based on the appropriateness of the Convention, the reputational costs of non-ratification, and acculturation (the US is not conforming to western democratic values). Until the 1980s, however, the opponents had the upper hand.
In the UK, the arguments used behind the scene were a different mix. In particular, the appropriateness of the Convention -the conviction that acceding to it was the right thing to do -played less of a role. The unfavourable comparison with communist countries was particularly uncomfortable:
'so long as we fail to accede, it is easy for countries who are ill-disposed towards us to cast doubt on Her Majesty's Government's position in the field of Human Rights.' 10 This argument thus rests predominantly on the reputational costs of non-accession, rather than on the appropriateness of the Convention.
In contrast, the Home Office argued that accession to the Convention would require the UK to change its legislation regarding political asylum, because article 7
states that genocide cannot be considered a political crime for the purposes of extradition.
The Extradition Act of 1870 prohibits the extradition of a fugitive criminal if the offence is of a political character. The Home Office argued that making an exception for genocide would not only destroy the absolute character of the extradition rule, but would make it difficult if not impossible to refuse extradition in cases where spurious accusations of genocide were made against someone benefitting from asylum in the UK. In Ireland, adjustment costs -and particularly the need to change domestic law with respect to extradition -proved to be the key obstacle to accession. The Irish Foreign
Affairs Department was not enthusiastic about the Convention: in 1951, the Convention was considered to be useless and superfluous, and inadequate because its purpose is penal rather than preventative. But the Department also held that:
although the Convention cannot be said to inspire any feeling of security, its condemnation of the crime of genocide, which includes religious persecution, is a healty [sic] indication of the abhorrence with which it is viewed by civilized states. Genocide is an international crime and any action against it must be by international accord and the Convention, while it might not go far enough, is at least a step in the right direction.
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There is evidence there of arguments based on both acculturation (other civilised states viewed the Convention as necessary) and a logic of appropriateness (the Convention is a step in the right direction).
In contrast, the Department of Justice was hostile, and adjustment costs motivated This section assesses why each country eventually accepted the Convention. As already noted, opponents considered domestic adjustment costs to be high in all three countries -principally because of the perceived clash with other cherished domestic norms. None of the three were subjected to pressure or persuasion from international actors. Thus, this section assesses the extent to which considerations of reputational costs, conviction, and acculturation played a role in the eventual decision to accept the Convention. Table 2 summarises the conclusions: In the US, domestic political manoeuvring, reputational costs, and conviction played key roles in the eventual ratification of the Convention, though acculturation helps explain the lack of enthusiasm for the Convention and illuminates the fact that the general context made it uncomfortable to continue to refuse to ratify. The Reagan administration had initially been indifferent to the Convention, and launched a long review of it. In 1984, citing the positive outcome of that review, Reagan announced his support for the Convention. He did so three days before he made a speech to the Jewish organisation condemned for visiting the cemetery, where 49 Nazi Waffen SS officials were buried, and for declining to visit a Holocaust memorial, though he belatedly added a visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp (Hoffman, 1985) . As a result of the public furore, Power argues that Reagan sought to undercut the critics by pressing for ratification of the Convention (Power, 2002: 163) . With a Republican president strongly supporting the Convention, the Republican Senators opposed to the Convention were caught out, though they successfully minimised the adjustment costs by forcing through a series of reservations to the Convention which would accompany the US ratification instrument.
In February 1986, the US Senate overwhelmingly approved ratification (83-11), but also attached a series of conditions (a 'sovereignty package') which meant that the US ratified the Convention with two reservations and five understandings. The two reservations asserted the primacy of the US Constitution over the Genocide Convention, and stipulated that before any dispute to which the US is a party may be submitted to the International Court of Justice, the specific consent of the US is required in each case (see LeBlanc, 1991: appendix C) . These reservations have generated controversy in other countries (the Netherlands, for example, does not accept that the US is a party to the Convention because it objects to the reservations; see Schabas, 2009: 628) , but the sovereignty package proved to be necessary for the Convention to surmount the ratification hurdles in the Senate. It is significant, however, that the US has not ratified other international human rights treaties (for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, or the International Criminal Court), even with a sovereignty package attached.
This points to some role for acculturation processes in this case: staying aloof from the Genocide Convention (but not other human rights treaties) in particular proved to be difficult, and the 'sovereignty package' indicates a rather superficial (and begrudging) acceptance of the Convention.
In the UK, a different mix of reasons led it to accede to the Convention, and acculturation processes here are more evident. In 1964, elections were won by the Labour party, and the incoming Prime Minister, Harold Wilson had already signalled his support for accession. During the 1964 election campaign Wilson indicated on two occasions that the UK should accede to the Genocide Convention. 16 In October 1962, in the debate on the Queen's speech, Harold Wilson, then the shadow Foreign Secretary, asked why the UK had not ratified the Genocide Convention, and argued that it was all the more urgent to do so because of the 'resurgence of evil, Nazi anti-social doctrines in this country'.
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This seems to indicate Wilson was aware of domestic costs of non-ratification. But the Labour Party was in general keen to improve the UK's influence in the United Nations, and to take a stronger positive stance on issues of freedom and racial equality (Smith, 2010: 50) . So conviction about the appropriate thing to do played a role in the Labour Party's stance. The importance of this legislation does not lie so much in the number of prosecutions to which it will give rise, or in the number of persons whose extradition for offences of genocide it will secure, as in the proof which it affords that the United Kingdom, as a civilised nation and a firm defender of human rights, condemns this barbaric crime and undertakes to prevent and to punish it.
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While a few MPs raised the extradition issue during the debate, the Genocide Bill passed smoothly through parliament, and received the royal assent on 27 March 1969. On 30 January 1970 the UK notified the UN of its accession to the Convention.
As is clear in the justifications presented for acceding to the Convention, a key concern of the UK was its identity as a 'civilised nation' and the fact that 'what civilised countries do' was the standard against which the UK was seen to be lacking. There is little sign of concern about the 'reputational costs' to the UK in the 1969 parliamentary debates (though these played a role earlier in Foreign Office support for the Convention), 20 Hansard, 5 February 1969 , col. 483. 21 Hansard, 5 February 1969 but some evidence of the logic of appropriateness -that the UK as a 'firm defender of human rights' should thus also accede to the Genocide Convention. However, the quotes also indicate a certain lack of conviction about the Convention (it won't make much of a difference), a sign of 'public conformity without private acceptance'.
José Alvarez has criticised the argument that acculturation may explain the UK's accession to the Genocide Convention: states don't just sign up to the Genocide Convention 'because everyone else is doing it'; states aren't 'like trendy teenagers unthinkingly following the latest fad' (Alvarez, 2004-05: 972) . He argues that it is very likely that considerations of costs and benefits instead played a role. Yet it is very difficult to ascertain that such a cost-benefit calculation was a crucial factor: there were no material incentives on offer to the UK if it acceded to the Convention; the costs of altering domestic legislation to comply with the Convention had already been noted and considered large beforehand. It is true that guarding against the resurgence of right-wing doctrines in domestic politics was mentioned in debates, and that the Foreign Office had been concerned about reputational costs. But in the debates on the Convention in parliament, the emphasis lay not so much on the costs to the UK of remaining aloof, but on the fact that the UK was standing uncomfortably apart from other western democracies. interests and values that was being done by not ratifying the Convention, indicating an element of acculturation. But it could be expected that acculturation would play less of a role in the western superpower than in other countries: the US considers itself a leader rather than a follower, and with little need to accept international human rights standards.
That the US ratified the Convention at all, however, still shows how powerful the antigenocide norm had become by the 1980s. The changing international context, in which guilt about the Holocaust loomed larger and the international human rights regime was developing quickly, made it much more uncomfortable for western democracies -even the most powerful western democracy -to stand aloof from the Genocide Convention.
In the UK, a newly-elected left-wing government simply ignored opposition from within the bureaucracy-and the purported adjustment costs in the end proved to be much less controversial when compared to the factors favouring accession. Those included the reputational costs of not acceding, but also the new human rights environment and the UK's isolation in the group of western democracies -indicating more of a role for acculturation than was the case in the US. Conviction that accession to the Convention was the appropriate thing to do arguably played less of a role in parliamentary debates than it did in the US.
In Ireland, a new prime minister (backed by the Foreign Affairs Department) could seize on the country's isolation to push for a Convention for which no one seemed particularly enthused -and which still took almost a decade to accept. Acculturation seems to account almost entirely for the government's decision to accede to the Convention. The unfavourable comparisons between Ireland's stance on the Convention and that of the other European Community member states played a prominent role in the arguments for the Convention, and the International Year of Human Rights 1968 was seized upon to generate momentum in favour of improving Ireland's human rights treaty ratification record. It might be expected that acculturation would play a prominent role in a small country -though Ireland nonetheless withstood comparison with other countries for almost thirty years. Interestingly, reputational costs did not feature in domestic debates, which also might be expected to be important to a small country, but evidently did not in this case.
In all three countries, 'public conformity without private acceptance' -a sign of acculturation -does seem to describe the domestic context in all three cases. The
Genocide Convention was accepted almost reluctantly, grudgingly, without that much conviction.
Acculturation may play a role in many other cases of acceptance of international norms. Acculturation, like the other ways in which norms can be diffused, depends on some countries moving first. The difference is that those countries are not then acting as norm entrepreneurs, actively seeking to spread the norm, but instead as models or reference points. Concern about being left out of a (growing) group of countries that have accepted the norm then helps to overcome domestic resistance to the norm. As with the other means of norm diffusion, this may take time, and what leads to actual internalisation of the norm is a subject worthy of further study.
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